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Uncertaninly, selection and optimunm institutions

8th National Competition for Economic Research Grants


Senior Researcher : Gino Gancia

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Research Centre or Institution : Centro de Investigación en Economía Internacional (CREI)


Objectives: to study how optimum political and contractual institutions reconcile the selection of politicians and executives with their long-term incentives. Results: (1) there is an endogenous transition in the optimum hiring of executives from long-term contracts in the early stages of development to short-term contracts in the more advanced stages. In addition, the optimal level of protection for investors is higher the more advanced an economy is. (2) Periods of great uncertainty favour the adoption of reforms, as their political cost is lower. The optimum is to limit mandates and pay politicians more at, respectively, intermediate and high levels of uncertainty.

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